Cryptographic Hashes and MACs

CMSC 426 - Computer Security

Outline

- Authentication vs. Confidentiality
- Message Authentication Codes (MACs)
- Simple Hash Functions
- Secure Hash Functions
- HMAC

Authentication

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- If Alice and Bob share a secret key and Alice sends Bob an encrypted message, can Bob assume the message is "authentic?"
- What do we mean by *authentic*?

Consider

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• A block cipher in ECB mode...

An attacker could re-order blocks in the message without affecting Bob's ability to decrypt it.

• A block cipher in CFB or CTR mode, or a stream cipher...

If the plaintext is highly structured, an attacker can modify the plaintext without decrypting the message.

In fact, it is possible to *authenticate* a message without *encrypting* the message.

Authentication and Confidentiality are distinct.

MACs

- Message Authentication Code
- FIPS PUB 113 (withdrawn) describes a simple DES-based MAC.
- Approach could be used with any block cipher.



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
FIPS PUB 113 MAC

- Alice has a message *M* to send to Bob.
- Bob wants to be sure *M* has not been modified.
- Alice and Bob each know a secret authentication key KAB.
 - 1. Alice encrypts M using DES in CBC mode using key K_{AB} and an all-zero IV.
 - 2. The last block of encryption C_n is the MAC.
 - 3. Alice sends *M* and the MAC to Bob.

Hash Functions

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- Given a message *M* of arbitrary length, a hash function H produces a fixed size *digest* H(*M*).
- It should be "easy" to compute H(*M*) for any *M*.
- Hashes are an alternative to MACs.



(Merkle-Damgard Construction; from Wikipedia, public domain)

Uses for Hashes

- For authentication and integrity.
- With encryption: append hash to *M* before encrypting.
- **Keyed hash**: Alice and Bob share a secret authentication key *K*; Alice authenticates message *M* by appending

 $h_{\mathcal{K}} = \mathsf{H}(M \mid \mid K)$

• **Digital signature**: Alice public-key encrypts the hash of *M* with her private key *A*_{priv}

 $s = \mathsf{E}[A_{\text{priv}}, \mathsf{H}(M)]$

Questions

Suppose Alice and Bob are using a keyed hash scheme with shared key K_{AB} . Alice sends Bob the message M along with H($M \parallel K_{AB}$).

- 1.How does Bob verify the message is really from Alice?
- 2.How does Bob verify that the message has not been altered?

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
Pre-Image Resistance

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- For any given hash code h, it should be infeasible to construct an M such that H(M) = h.
- In the keyed hash case, pre-image resistance prevents an attacker from recovering *M*||*K*, and thus *K*.

Weak Collision Resistance

- For **any given** message *M*, it should be infeasible to construct a different message *N* such that H(M) = H(N).
- In digital signature applications, lack of weak collision resistance allows an attacker to find a different message with the same signature.



Strong Collision Resistance

- It should be infeasible to construct a pair of different messages (M, N) such that H(M) = H(N).
- Subtly different from weak collision resistance.
- Prevents the following sort of attack:
 - 1. Eve constructs two messages with the same hash value. One is an I.O.U. for \$10, the other is an I.O.U. for \$10,000.
 - Eve gets Alice to sign the \$10 I.O.U.
 - Eve insists on being paid her \$10,000.

Suppose H() is a strongly collision resistant hash function that maps messages of arbitrary length to an *n*-bit hash value.

1. Is it true that for all distinct messages x and y, H(x) \neq H(y)?

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Simple Hash Functions

• Break the *M* into *b*-bit blocks M_1, M_2, \ldots, M_n .

 $h=M_1\oplus M_2\oplus \cdots \oplus M_n$

- A variation: let r(x, n) denote the left circular shift of x by n bits
 - $h = M_1 \oplus r(M_2, 1) \oplus \cdots \oplus r(M_n, n-1)$
- There are 2^b possible hash codes, so if the message is modified or corrupted, there is probability 2^{-b} that the hash code *h* will be unchanged.

- Unfortunately, neither of these schemes is **collision resistant** (weak or strong).
- For the first example, construct the following messages:

 $M = M_1, M_2$

 $N=N_1,\ N_2,\ M_1 \oplus M_2 \oplus N_1 \oplus N_2$

- If H is the first simple hash, then H(M) = H(N).
- What about the second example hash?

One More Example

• Another simple hash: let a message be represented by a list of integers

 $M = (a_1, a_2, ..., a_t)$

• Let N be a positive integer and define H(M) by



• Is *H* pre-image resistant?

Brute Force Costs

For an ideal hash with digest of size *n*:


- Constructing a **pre-image**: 2ⁿ hash computations
- Finding a **weak collision**: 2^{*n*} hash computations
- Finding a **strong collision**: 2^{n/2} hash computations (this is due to the birthday problem)

For example, the MD5 message digest is 128 bits, so it should take 2⁶⁴ hash computations to find a strong collision pair.

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MD5

- Ron Rivest, 1992
- Operates on 32-bit words with addition mod 2³²
- Message processed in 512-bit "chunks" broken into 16 32-bit words.
- Basic function applied 64 times per chunk (4 x 16).



(from Wikipedia by Surachit; CC A-SA 3.0)

MD5 Attacks

- 2004 Wang, Fang, Lai, and Yu demonstrate first practical collision
- 2005 Lenstra, Wang, de Weger produce colliding X.509 certificates
- 2008 "normal" certificate converted to intermediate CA certificate
- 2012 Flame malware uses fraudulent MS code signing certificate; constructed using collision

The SHA Family

Algorithm	Comments	Reference
SHA-0	Had problems	FIPS PUB 180 (1993)
SHA-1	Corrected problems in SHA-0; similar to MD5	FIPS PUB 180-1 (1995)
SHA-2	Family of algorithms (SHA-256, SHA-512, etc.)	FIPS PUB 180-2 (2002)
SHA-3	Very different algorithm; selected in 2012	FIPS PUB 202 (2015)

Current Status


- SHA-0 and SHA-1 produce a 160 bit digest, so 80 bits of security for strong collision resistance. Too small?!
- SHA-2 provides 256-, 384-, and 512-bit options. No known attacks against SHA-2, but mathematics is similar to MD5, so NIST wanted an alternative...just in case.
- SHA-3 selected in 2012 after an open competition. It is quite different from SHA-2.

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SHA-512

- Processes message in 1024-bit blocks.
- Maintains 512-bit internal state.
- Uses an 80-round function to update state for each block.
- Digest is state after processing the last message block.

SHA-512 Two full blocks and one partial block



The F-function


- The F-function consists of 80 rounds.
- Each round involves basic boolean operations (AND, OR, XOR, NOT).
- Each round incorporates a portion of the message block (*W*_t) and a constant (*K*_t).

The F-function provides good mixing. Each digest bit is a function of every input bit.

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SHA-3

- "Sponge" construction
- f-function operates on 1600-bit state
- Message blocks xor-ed with state



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HMAC

- HMAC *Hash-based MAC* published in RFC 2104 and FIPS 198-1.
- Improves on security of basic keyed hash.
- Security of HMAC depends only on security of the hash function.

 $\mathsf{HMAC}(K, M) = \mathsf{H}[(K \oplus op) || \mathsf{H}[(K \oplus ip) || M]]$

- H[] is the hash function.
- *K* is the secret key, padded with zeros on the left to match the hash block size.
- op is a constant (0x5c repeated).
- *ip* is a constant (0x36 repeated).

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Using an HMAC

Use an HMAC just as we would a keyed hash:

- Alice and Bob have secret key K
- Alice computes HMAC of message *M* using key *K* and sends *M* and HMAC to Bob.
- Bob computes HMAC of received message using key *K* and checks it against the value Alice sent; if they match, all is good!

Next time: Public Key Cryptography

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