Secure Shell CMSC 426/626 - Fall 2014

Outline

- Attacks and Vulnerabilities
- The Dark Ages: Telnet, Rlogin, and Rsh
- Secure Shell (SSH)

Attacks and Vulnerabilities

- Interception "sniffing" unencrypted packets; session hijacking; Man-in-the-Middle (MitM).
- *Modification* alteration of packet contents; Man-in-the-Middle.
- Falsification fake hosts; Source IP Spoofing, Man-in-the-Middle, blind injection.
- Interruption Denial of Service.

Telnet

- Remote terminal protocol defined in multiple RFCs spanning 35 years.
- Data unencrypted no additional confidentiality.
 User names and passwords sent in the clear!
- No authentication of hosts beyond what is provided by TCP/IP and DNS.

SSH History

- The first version, SSH-1, was developed in 1995 in Finland by a victim of a sniffing attack.
- Designed to replace Telnet and related utilities.
- Originally open source, but became proprietary over time (developer started a company).
- **SSH-2** developed by the IETF. Adopted as a standard in 2006.



We'll only look at the *Transport* and *Authentication* protocols...

...that's where most of the security-related processing occurs.

But first we have to understand *host keys*.

Server Host Keys

- RSA or Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) keys (private and public parts in separate files).
- Used to authenticate the *server to the client* in the Transport Protocol; server signs a message using its private key.
- Client needs to know the server's public key



- In most cases, the server just sends the key, and the user must decide whether to trust it or not.
- Once a server public key is accepted, the client stores it, so in the future it doesn't have to ask the server for its key.
- This information is in .ssh/known hosts:

linux.gl.umbc.edu,130.85.12.141 ssh-rsa
AAAAB3NzaClyc2EAAAABIwAAA1EAyrNkS66wMRU3HBDE5gxP7unqorXtkW5B23XnTHl3
qmVve7Ivo58001+Ppe6jWrIkRy03i6137J9sx0AjgND553pj++XYtrAQV7AHaq9n4ViQF
7ZP8PiV/oeMJxicglgIRo2Rd3VnCyVV+ukgZjS/Kvty/UED1ZZjWwDBRB5MwWb0=

In a more security conscious environment, the public host keys could be distributed more securely:

- In the form of a *certificate* signed by a *certification authority* (CA).
- Distributed out-of-band, e.g. delivered on removable media or downloaded through a separate, secure channel such as TLS.

Transport Protocol

- Identify client and server software versions
- Negotiate cryptographic algorithms
- Derive a shared secret key using DH
- Authenticate server through signed message
- Initiate encrypted connection

Details: SSH Background

Client Authentication

- Two primary methods: password or public key.
- Password method is straightforward:
- Client sends password authentication request
- Client sends password
- Authentication occurs after the connection has become encrypted, so password is protected.
- The server can reject password authentication request
- Public key authentication is a little more involved
- Client has public and private keys
- Public key is known to server (how?)
- Client requests public key authentication; sends PKC algorithm and public key
- Client sends a signed message and the server verifies the signature
- Server can reject authentication request outright or authentication can fail due to a signature error.

Supported Encryption

OpenSSH supported symmetric algorithms:

• 3DES (triple DES)

Blowfish

· AFS

• RC4

CAST128

Supported authentication algorithms:

- DSA
- RSA
- Elliptic Curve DSA (ECDSA)
- Edwards Curve DSA (EdDSA or Ed25519)

How does SSH Help? • Doesn't quite defeat Falsification, but makes it a lot harder. - Both server and client are cryptographically authenticated. - Vulnerable when server sends host key for the first time. • Protects against *Interception* through the use of strong Exercises are on the website.