

Network Security

CMSC 426/626 - Fall 2014



THEY GOT A BRANCH OF VIRUS, WHICH'S
MACHINES NETWORKED TOGETHER, HOOKED-UP
BY AN INFINITE FINE FROM THE NET. THEY
EXCISE SPAIN, ATTACHMENTS, SHAVE FRILLS,
AND HAVE NO SECURITY PROBLEMS.



BETWEEN
THEM THEY
HAVE PRACTICALLY
ERASED VIRUS.

THERE ARE THE TRUSTING WARRIOR LEADERS
AND ALL SORTS OF EXOTIC GROUPS PERFORMING.
A FORTUNE TELLER, A GUY AND A WIFE'S
PROMISES OF SHEDS. THE SECURITY SQUAD
THE VIRUSES AS THEY MOVE THROUGH THE
NETWORK.



GENUINE AND
SPEAKING.

YOU KNOW, GOOD MORNING,
NORMAL PEOPLE. BROTHERS, ARE
THAT HAVE YOU AND
FOURTEEN. GETTING
IT ALONG.



WAS A GOOD VIRUS?
YOU ARE. YES, YOU ARE!



PRETTY OKAY IT?



WHAT IS IT?

Network Insecurity

Overview

- Internet protocol layers - TCP/IP model
- Details of specific layers
 - Link Layer
 - Internet Layer
 - Transport Layer

TCP/IP Layer Model

- *Physical Layer* - wires, fiber, radios, etc.
- *Link Layer* - local / point-to-point communications
- *Internet Layer* - host-to-host communications
- *Transport Layer* - application-to-application communications (via ports)
- *Application Layer* - high-level protocols to provide useful network functions


Link Layer

- Connection of machines on a local network, e.g. on the same wire or AP.
- Common link layer technologies:
 - *Ethernet* (wired)
 - *802.11* (wifi)
- Extending the network: hubs and switches

Media Access Control

- Devices on the network are identified by 48-bit *Media Access Control* (MAC) address.
- Written as six bytes, e.g. 00:1b:63:07:1c:c1.
- MAC addresses are assigned by vendors; meant to be unique, but easily changed
- Ethernet frame includes MACs, payload, CRC-32 checksum

Ethernet Frame



- Preamble not used in modern networks; SFD is Starting Frame Delimiter
- Destination & Source addresses are MACs
- Type / Length indicates protocol being carried, e.g. 0x800 for IPv4, 0x0806 for ARP, etc.

Address Resolution

- Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) maps IP addresses to MACs on a local network
- Host broadcasts a message requesting MAC for a given IP; machine with the given IP responds with its MAC




ARP Spoofing



ARP Spoofing

- IP/MAC associations are cached
- Machine can “volunteer” its MAC address, and it will be believed (and info cached)
- Spoof two machines to create Main-in-the-Middle...

ARP MitM



Countermeasures

- Static ARP tables
 - Can be a nuisance to maintain
- ARP spoofing detection software - AntiArp (Win), ArpStar (Linux)


Internet Layer

- Transports packets from one host to another, across network boundaries if necessary
- *Internet Protocol (IP)* - best effort routing of data packets
- IP addresses - IPv4 (32 bits), IPv6 (128 bits)


IP Routing

- Destination IP on same LAN?
 - Get MAC via ARP and forward packets directly
- Destination IP on different LAN?
 - Forward packets to *gateway router*
- Gateway is responsible for further routing
- *Routing tables* indicate which router packets should be sent to next

IP Routing



IPv4 Packet



Time-to-live

- Don't want packets to bounce around the network forever
- *Time-to-live* (TTL) is the maximum number of router visits (*hops*) that a packet is allowed before it is dropped
- TTL is decremented by each router that handles a packet
- When TTL goes to zero, packet is dropped and an error packet is returned to source host

ICMP

- *Internet Control Message Protocol* (ICMP) - Internet layer protocol for testing and error notification.
- ICMP packet types include
 - *Echo Request* - asks destination to acknowledge
 - *Echo Response* - acknowledges an Echo Request
 - *Time Exceeded* - notification that packet expired
 - *Destination Unreachable* - packet could not be delivered

ICMP Applications

- Ping - Echo Request / Echo Response to determine if a host is operating
- Traceroute - determine path to a host; clever use of TTL field

Sample Traceroute

```
traceroute to www.google.com (74.125.225.51), 64 hops max, 52 byte packets
 0 192.168.1.1 <local> 0.000 ms 0.000 ms 0.000 ms
 1 192.168.1.1 <local> 0.000 ms 0.000 ms 0.000 ms
 2 108.110.1.1 <local> 0.000 ms 0.000 ms 0.000 ms
 3 68-1-1-1 <local> 0.000 ms 0.000 ms 0.000 ms
 4 68-1-1-1 <local> 0.000 ms 0.000 ms 0.000 ms
 5 0.0.0.0 <local> 0.000 ms 0.000 ms 0.000 ms
 6 0.0.0.0 <local> 0.000 ms 0.000 ms 0.000 ms
 7 0.0.0.0 <local> 0.000 ms 0.000 ms 0.000 ms
 8 0.0.0.0 <local> 0.000 ms 0.000 ms 0.000 ms
 9 0.0.0.0 <local> 0.000 ms 0.000 ms 0.000 ms
10 0.0.0.0 <local> 0.000 ms 0.000 ms 0.000 ms
11 0.0.0.0 <local> 0.000 ms 0.000 ms 0.000 ms
12 0.0.0.0 <local> 0.000 ms 0.000 ms 0.000 ms
13 0.0.0.0 <local> 0.000 ms 0.000 ms 0.000 ms
```

IP Spoofing

- There is no authentication of the Source Address in an IP packet - can be spoofed
- Valid use of IP Spoofing in e.g. server testing
- Attacker may spoof the source address, but he will not see responses
 - May not care about response, e.g. in Denial of Service attacks
 - May have other way to collect response

Preventing Spoofing

- Filtering at the network border
 - block incoming packets with source address that is inside the administrative domain
 - block outgoing packets with source address that is outside the domain
- *IP traceback* - techniques for determining a packets source and path thru the network

Transport Layer

- Provide communications between processes / services on networked hosts
- Processes / services associated with *ports*; there are 2^{16} different port numbers
- *Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)* - reliable, connection-oriented protocol
- *User Datagram Protocol (UDP)* - “best effort” communications

TCP Connections

- The *Three-way Handshake*



TCP Session Prediction

- Suppose an attacker has the ability to predict the sequence number in a SYN-ACK packet...
- Can spoof source IP in SYN, predict sequence number in SYN-ACK, and generate valid ACK, establishing TCP connection
- **BUT** attacker will not see server responses - *Blind Injection*

Session Hijacking

- Attacker on the same network segment as the client or server can carry out a *complete session hijacking attack*
- Use packet sniffing to observe target server responses including SYN-ACK sequence number
- Send valid ACK and create TCP session
- Need to control victim (client) responses
 - Denial of Service to prevent victim from responding
 - Combine with MitM (e.g. ARP spoofing) to control client-server traffic and inject TCP packets

Countermeasures

- Encryption and authentication at Internet or application layer
- Web sites should avoid using secure authentication and then switching to unsecured content

Odds-and-ends

- *User Datagram Protocol (UDP)* - will talk about this when we cover DNS
- TCP and UDP packet formats are described in the textbook
- *Network Address Translation (NAT)* is discussed in the text. Not a security technology, but has security implications

Exercises are on the website.
