CMSC 477/677 - Spring 2007
Discussion Questions for Class #14, March 15
Reading: Wooldridge (Appendix A) and Chapter 6.
- A rational agent's utility function will satisfy the properties
(p. 107) of reflexivity, transitivity, and comparability. Do you
think all agents (e.g., humans) actually have utility functions that
satisfy these properties? If they do not, how would that affect the
ways in which we design our agents to interact with them?
- Figure 6.2 (p. 108) shows the relationship between money and
utility graphically. Do you think this relationship is constant
across (human) agents? If not, how would that affect their
interactions?
- What is the difference between strong dominance and
weak dominance?
- Why do some interaction scenarios not have any Nash
equilibrium? Can you give some real-world examples?
- Why do some interaction scenarios have more than one
Nash equilibrium? Can you give some real-world examples?
- Can you think of a (real-world or contrived) example of an
interaction scenario that is strictly competitive but not
zero-sum?
- The payoff matrix for the Prisoner's Dilemma is designed to create
a "everybody defects" Nash equilibrium. How could you change the
payoff matrix to move or eliminate the Nash equilibrium? How
sensitive is the equilibrium to the specific numbers that are chosen
(e.g., if you change the payoff of 3 to 3.2, would that matter)?
- Why is the iterated prisoner's dilemma a different game from the
PD? Is there a Nash equilibrium for the IPD?