

# CMSC 671 Fall 2010

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#### Decision Making Under Uncertainty Chapter 16

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Some material from Lise Getoor, Jean-Claude Latombe, and Daphne Koller

#### Decision Making Under Uncertainty

- Decision theoretic agents
  - Combine
    - Probability theory
    - Utility theory
  - Make rational decisions based on
    - what it believes
    - what it wants



#### Decision Making Under Uncertainty

- Many environments have multiple possible outcomes
- Some of these outcomes may be good; others may be bad
- Some may be very likely; others unlikely
- What's a poor agent to do??

## **Probabilistic outcomes**

- The probability of outcome *s*' given evidence observations *e*:
  - $\square P(Result(a)=s'|a,e)$
- Desirability of a state (agent's preferences):
  U(s)
- Expected utility of an action given the evidence:
   EU(ale) = \sum\_{s'} P(Result(a)=s'|a,e)U(s')
- Maximum expected utility:

•  $action = argmax_a EU(a|e)$ 





Non-Deterministic vs. Probabilistic Uncertainty



#### Expected Utility

- Random variable X with n values x<sub>1</sub>,...,x<sub>n</sub> and distribution (p<sub>1</sub>,...,p<sub>n</sub>)
   E.g.: X is the state reached after doing an action A under uncertainty
- Function U of X
   E.g., U is the utility of a state
- The expected utility of A is  $EU[A] = \sum_{i=1,...,n} p(x_i|A)U(x_i)$





#### One State/Two Actions Example



#### Introducing Action Costs



 $- \circ \circ \circ$ 

## **MEU Principle**

- A rational agent should choose the action that maximizes agent's expected utility
- This is the basis of the field of decision theory
- The MEU principle provides a normative criterion for rational choice of action
  - AI is solved!!!



# Not quite...

- Must have a **complete** model of:
  - Actions
  - Utilities
  - States
- Even if you have a complete model, decision making is computationally **intractable**
- In fact, a truly rational agent takes into account the utility of reasoning as well (**bounded rationality**)
- Nevertheless, great progress has been made in this area recently, and we are able to solve much more complex decision-theoretic problems than ever before

# Agent preferences (notation)

- A>B
  - The agent prefers A over B
- A~B
  - The agent is indifferent between A and B
- A>~B
  - The agent prefers A over B or is indifferent between them



### **Axioms of Utility Theory**

- Orderability
  - $\square (A > B) \lor (A < B) \lor (A \sim B)$
- Transitivity •  $(A>B) \land (B>C) \Rightarrow (A>C)$
- Continuity
  - $A > B > C \Rightarrow \exists p [p,A; 1-p,C] \sim B$
- Substitutability
  - $A \sim B \Rightarrow [p,A; 1-p,C] \sim [p,B; 1-p,C]$
- Monotonicity
  - $\ \ \, A {>} B \Rightarrow (p {\geq} q \Leftrightarrow [p, A; 1 {-} p, B] {>} {\sim} [q, A; 1 {-} q, B])$
  - Also for A~B
- Decomposability

  - (figure above)



#### Value Function

- Provides a ranking of alternatives, but not a meaningful metric scale
- Also known as an "ordinal utility function"
- Sometimes, only relative judgments (value functions) are necessary
- At other times, absolute judgments (utility functions) are required



# **Money Versus Utility**

- Money <> Utility
  - More money is better, but not always in a linear relationship to the amount of money
- Expected Monetary Value
  - TV game show: you have won \$1,000,000
  - Take it or Gamble (flip coin to get \$2,500,000)
  - EMV = .5(\$0) + .5(2,500,000) = 1,250,000
  - 1,250,000 > 1,000,000: rational agent should take it right?
  - Assign utilities (might be different for average people and billionares)

# **Money Versus Utility**

- Money <> Utility
  - More money is better, but not always in a linear relationship to the amount of money
- Expected Monetary Value
- Risk-averse:  $U(L) < U(S_{EMV(L)})$
- Risk-seeking:  $U(L) > U(S_{EMV(L)})$
- Risk-neutral:  $U(L) = U(S_{EMV(L)})$

# Multiattribute Utility Theory

- A given state may have multiple utilities
  - ...because of multiple evaluation criteria
  - ...because of multiple agents (interested parties) with different utility functions
- We will talk about this more later in the semester, when we discuss multi-agent systems and game theory



#### **Decision Networks**

- Extend BNs to handle **actions** and **utilities**
- Also called *influence diagrams*
- Use BN inference methods to solve
- Perform Value of Information calculations



#### **Decision Networks cont.**







Utility/value nodes: the utility of an outcome state





Siting a new airport requires consideration of the disruption caused by construction; the cost of land; the distance from centers of population; the noise of flight operations; safety issues arising from local topography; weather conditions; and so on.

#### **Umbrella Network**



# Evaluating Decision Networks

- Set the evidence variables for current state
- For each possible value of the decision node:
  - Set decision node to that value
  - Calculate the posterior probability of the parent nodes of the utility node, using BN inference
  - Calculate the resulting utility for each action
- Return the action with the highest utility

#### Decision Making: Umbrella Network

Should I take my umbrella??



# Value of Information (VOI)

 Suppose an agent's current knowledge is e. The value of the current best action α is (slide 4):

 $EU(\alpha|e) = max_a \sum_{s'} P(Result(a) = s'|a, e) U(s')$ 

The value of the new best action after new evidence e' is obtained (E'=e'):

$$EU(\alpha'|e,e') = max_a \sum_{s'} P(Result(a) = s'|a,e,e') U(s')$$

• The value of information for E' is therefore:

$$VOI(E') = \sum_{k} P(e_{k} \mid e) EU(\alpha_{e_{k}} \mid e_{k}, e) - EU(\alpha \mid e)$$

#### Value of Information: Umbrella Network

What is the value of knowing the weather forecast?

