

Sources: John Gasper, Principles of Game Theory; Pedro Domingos, Decision Theory; Randall Munroe, XKCD; Wikipedia, various



# Decision Making in Technology

*A painfully brief intro to game theory, decision theory, utility and preferences, and equilibria*

RJ10, 3D Printing: **Sunday**  
Paper Topic: **Tuesday**



# Bookkeeping

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- ◆ Paper and paper topic
  - ◆ Paper topic: November 4<sup>th</sup> (Tuesday) at midnight
    - ◆ Topic; primary ethical concern or sub-area; proposed title
  - ◆ Paper due: last day of class
    - ◆ There will be some in-between steps posted Tuesday
  - ◆ You MAY work with ONE partner
    - ◆ Shared presentation
    - ◆ Recommend 50% longer paper (6 instead of 4)
    - ◆ Written statements about what each person did
- ◆ Last ~3 class periods: presentations
- ◆ Participation Portfolio 2 will be due Nov 8<sup>th</sup>



# Bookkeeping


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- ◆ Midterms
  - ◆ Don't be alarmed by essay grades – always curved
    - ◆ Essay grading: there's always something to improve
  - ◆ Specific concerns? 1-week window
    - ◆ **Please do** come ask questions or object!
- ◆ Ethical Analysis 2 will be posted Monday
  - ◆ Due Nov. 17th – two weeks later

# How Do Agents Make Decisions?

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
- ◆ What agents?
  - ◆ People: “You”; “Everyone else”
  - ◆ Computer systems (real-time and not)
  - ◆ Artificial intelligences (many kinds)



# When Do Computers Make Decisions?

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- ◆ At every fork in a search problem
- ◆ Every time a credit card is run
- ◆ Every time a prescription is filled
- ◆ ...a book is recommended
- ◆ ...a dossier is flagged
- ◆ ...a command is interpreted
- ◆ And so on.





# Terminology and Concepts

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- ◆ Optimizing: obtaining best possible outcome
  - ◆ Maximizing the value of some *objective function*
- ◆ Objective Function
  - ◆ A mathematical expression whose output you want to maximize/minimize
  - ◆ Optimization is finding the right *input parameters*
- ◆ Multi-objective optimization
  - ◆ Finding the best possible parameters given *multiple* objective functions



# Terminology and Concepts

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- ◆ Expected Value
  - ◆ The predicted value of a variable, calculated as:
  - ◆ The sum of all possible values, *each* multiplied by the probability of its occurrence

**A \$1000 bet for a 20% chance to win \$10,000**  
 **$[20\%(\$10,000)+80\%(\$0)] = \$2000$**

- ◆ Satisficing: achieving a goal *sufficiently*
  - ◆ You can win a baseball game by one point now, or by two points in another inning
  - ◆ You can have a search function that finishes in one second, or spend another 2 hours to make it half a second; full credit is 3 seconds or less



# Terminology and Concepts

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
- ◆ Game Theory
  - ◆ *Mathematical* models of interaction
  - ◆ Between intelligent, rational decision-makers
- ◆ Decision Theory
  - ◆ Normative: how *should* agents make decisions?
  - ◆ Descriptive: how *do* agents make decisions?
- ◆ Utility and utility functions
  - ◆ Something's perceived ability to satisfy needs or wants
  - ◆ A mathematical function that ranks alternatives by utility



# What is Game Theory?

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- ◆ Study of rational behavior in interactive situations
  - ◆ Everyone is self-interested and selfish
  - ◆ Or at least rational (weaker than selfish)
- ◆ Problems:
  - ◆ We aren't "rational" (agents *can* be)
  - ◆ Knowing theory doesn't guarantee success
- ◆ Goal: optimize chances of success
  - ◆ Achieving some target state
  - ◆ Optimizing some value





# More Terminology

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- ◆ Rationality (an overloaded word).
- ◆ A rational agent...
  - ◆ Behaves according to a *ranking over possible outcomes* that is:
    - ◆ Complete (covers all situations) and consistent
    - ◆ Optimizes over strategies to best serve a desired interest
- ◆ Has logical implications of knowledge
  - ◆ Assume that players have logical omniscience
    - ◆ If player 1 knows A, then 1 knows all of the logical implications of A
  - ◆ Assume players know all possible implications
    - ◆ If 2 knows that 1 knows that 2 knows that ...



# Classifying games

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1. Sequential or simultaneous move?
  - ◆ Does a player get to change actions based on others' behavior?  
Tic-tac-toe ; **rock paper scissors**
2. Zero-sum?
  - ◆ Gain or loss is exactly balanced by opponent's gain or loss  
Chess ; tic-tac-toe ; **soccer**
3. One shot or repeated?
  - ◆ Either one is not necessarily easier or harder
  - ◆ Opportunity to build *reputation* (for good or bad)



# Classifying games

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4. Full, partial, or asymmetric information?
  - ◆ Perfect information:
    - ◆ Each player has information of all previous events  
chess ; battleship
  - ◆ Complete information:
    - ◆ Every player knows payoffs for all possible actions  
tic-tac-toe ; Prisoner's Dilemma ; car buying
5. Non-cooperative or cooperative?
  - ◆ Are agreements enforceable?



# Prisoner's Dilemma

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		Player 1	
		Silence	Testify
Player 2	Silence	P1: 6 months P2: 6 months	P1: Free P2: 10 years
	Testify	P1: 10 years P2: Free	P1: 5 years P2: 5 years

- ◆ One-shot or repeated?
  - ◆ Actually, either.
- ◆ Simultaneous?
- ◆ Zero-sum?
- ◆ Any uncertainty?
- ◆ Fixed rules?
- ◆ Cooperative?



# Elements of a Game

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Conceptual elements:

## 1. Actions and Strategies

- ◆ *Actions*: the available actions any singular point
- ◆ *Strategy*: complete plan for deciding actions
  - ◆ Different from “tactics and strategies”

## 2. Payoffs

- ◆ An objective isn't necessarily “winning”!
  - ◆ See: non-zero-sum games; car buying
- ◆ Represent preferences with a *payoff function*
- ◆ Can be monetary but will be represented by *utility*



# What is Decision Theory?


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- ◆ Mathematical study of strategies for optimal decision-making
  - ◆ Options involve different *risks* or *expectations of gain or loss*
- ◆ The study of identifying:
  - ◆ The *values, uncertainties* and other issues relevant to a decision
  - ◆ The resulting *optimal decision*
- ◆ **What does decision mean?**

# Utility

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- ◆ Utility: **perceived** ability to satisfy needs or wants
- ◆ Utility function: Mathematical  $f$  that ranks alternatives
- ◆ Marginal utility: utility of subsequent iterations of thing
- ◆ Total utility: Utility of consuming ALL THE THINGS









# Rational Preferences


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- ◆ Preferences of a rational agent must obey constraints
  - ◆ Transitivity
  - ◆ Monotonicity
  - ◆ Orderability  $(A \succ B) \vee (B \succ A) \vee (A \sim B)$
  - ◆ Substitutability  $(A \sim B \Rightarrow [p, A; 1-p, C] \sim [p, B; 1-p, C])$
  - ◆ Continuity  $(A \succ B \succ C \Rightarrow \exists p [p, A; 1-p, C] \sim B)$
- ◆ Rational preferences, when followed, give behavior that *maximizes expected utility*.
- ◆ Violating the constraints leads to irrationality
  - ◆ For example: an agent with intransitive preferences can be induced to give away all its money.

# Maximizing Expected Utility

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- ◆ Utilities map *states* to *real numbers*. Which numbers?
  - ◆ People are very bad at mapping their own preferences
- ◆ Standard approach to assessment of human utilities:
  - ◆ Compare a state  $A$  to a standard lottery  $L_p$  that has
    - “best possible prize”  $u_T$  with probability  $p$
    - “worst possible catastrophe”  $u_L$  with probability  $(1-p)$
  - ◆ adjust lottery probability  $p$  until  $A \sim L_p$





# Money

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- ◆ Money does not behave as a utility function
  - ◆ That is, people don't maximize expected value of *dollar assets*.
- ◆ People are risk-averse:
  - ◆ Given a lottery  $L$  with expected monetary value  $EMV(L)$ , usually  $U(L) < U(EMV(L))$

Want to bet \$1000 for a 20% chance to win \$10,000?  
 $[20\%(\$10,000) + 80\%(\$0)] = \$2000 > [100\%(\$1000)]$

- ◆ Expected Utility Hypothesis
  - ◆ rational behavior maximizes the expectation of some function  $u$ , which in need not be monetary



# Actual Utility Scales

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- ◆ Micromorts: one-millionth chance of death
  - ◆ Useful for:
    - ◆ Russian roulette
    - ◆ Paying to reduce product risks, etc.
  
- ◆ QALYs: quality-adjusted life years
  - ◆ Useful for:
    - ◆ Medical decisions involving substantial risk



# Equilibria

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- ◆ *Nash Equilibrium*: a state where no party has an incentive to unilaterally change strategies

		Player 1	
		Silence	Testify
Player 2	Silence	P1: 6 months P2: 6 months	P1: Free P2: 10 years
	Testify	P1: 10 years P2: Free	P1: 5 years P2: 5 years

- ◆ P1 and P2 have both always testified.
  - ◆ Who has incentive to be silent next round?
- ◆ Are there other equilibria?
- ◆ What game element would make it possible to change?



# More Terminology

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- ◆ Multi-objective optimization
  - ◆ Finding the best possible parameters given *multiple* objective functions
  - ◆ Decisions need to be optimized given **trade-offs** between two or more conflicting objectives
    - ◆ Minimizing cost **and** maximizing comfort while buying a car
- ◆ Pareto-optimal: no function can improve without another one degrading
  - ◆ It's impossible to make anyone better off without making someone worse off



# When Do We Care?

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- ◆ Deciding Whether to Approve a CC Transaction

	Approve	Don't Approve
Fraudulent	<b>Gain: None</b> <b>Cost: Lost value of transaction</b>	<b>Gain: Customer trust</b> <b>Cost: Minor customer inconvenience; reissuing fee</b>
Not fraudulent	<b>Gain: Improved customer trust; transaction fee</b> <b>Cost: None</b>	<b>Gain: None</b> <b>Cost: Major customer inconvenience; loss of trust; reissuing fee</b>





# When Do We Care?

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## ◆ Recommend a Book

	They buy it	They don't
Show a few good options	Gain: \$\$ Cost: Calculating options; possible minimal annoyance	Gain: None Cost: Minimal annoyance
Show a whole bunch of options	Gain: \$\$ Cost: Calculating options; they may or may not be substantially annoyed	Gain: None Cost: Potentially substantial annoyance